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1 Introduction
When communities identify their own problems,
make all key decisions on goals and means, and
mobilise to carry out their own plans, this is com-
monly recognised as representing 'a high degree of
participation'. This is often shown diagrammati-
cally at the top end of a 'ladder of participation', in
contrast to lesser degrees of participation, such as
'consultation', 'delegation', or 'passive participation'
(e.g. CPGUKAN 1991; Pretty et al. 1994). In the
experience of the author, such criteria are widely
accepted among development workers. This article
analyses a participatory evaluation of one village-
based health pre-payrnent scheme in a poor village
in China. The main focus of the article is on issues
concerning participation at a micro-level, both in
the scheme and in the evaluation. Analysis of the
process points to the influence that different inter-
ests, different channels for voicing interests, and
unequal power relations have in determining the
outcome of decision-making processes. The article
concludes that participation, as widely understood
by development workers, is not a sufficient condi-
tian for ensuring the accountability of health
scheme managers and providers at the micro-level.
Section 2 provides an introduction to and evalua-
tion of the health pre-payment scheme. Section 3
analyses the key issues revealed by the evaluation
in terms of the impact of different modes of partic-
ipation on the outcomes of decision-making
processes. The conclusions are presented in the
final section.
2 Background to the Laba Village
Community Medical Scheme
Laba village is an administrative unit consisting of
four hamlets, close to the border with Myanmar.
Laba village is inhabited by 2,595 people, all of
whom are Lahu, an ethnic minority Most of the vil-
lagers are Christian, and regularly attend church
services. The village is 18 km. from the nearest
township, where there is a health centre, a journey
that takes a half-day walk. There has been a formal
village doctor since the 1960s when Zhang Zhaqi,
a traditional Lahu herbal doctor, was trained in
simple Western medicine as a 'barefoot doctor'. In
the 1970s and early 1980s two other health work-
ers were trained (one male and one female), who
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immunisation, and maternal and child health ser-
vices respectively within the administrative village.
They also provide simple curative treatments in the
outlying hamlets where they live.
During the Cultural Revolution, Laba village imple-
mented a health pre-payment scheme (referred to as
a Cooperative Medical Scheme, or CMS) like almost
all other villages in China. The CMS provided free
outpatient treatments to villagers. Unlike schemes in
most other villages in China, the CMS in Laba sur-
vived after the introduction of the household respon-
sibility system in the early 1980s.1 Until the
mid-nineties, each villager still contributed two yuan
each year for the CMS. But with rising drug prices,
the Laba CMS could no longer sustain service provi-
sion at a level of subsidy satisfactory to villagers.
Laba village began implementing income genera-
tion projects funded by Oxfam Hong Kong in the
early 1990s. In 1995, Oxfam HR provided funds for
villagers to establish a traditional medicinal herb
plantation. In 1996, villagers expressed their inter-
est to Oxfam HR in reviving the CMS. Among other
support, Oxfam HR provided 10,000 yuan as a seed
fund to purchase drugs.2 Two additional newly
trained health workers began to serve in the village
clinic under the direction of Zhang Zhaqi, who
became also 'senior advisor' and de facto head of the
CMS Fund Management Committee. With the for-
mulation of a series of new management regulations
in Spring 1998, the Laba CMS was implemented by
villagers under the direction of the committee and
village cadres. Details of the new scheme are out-
lined in Box 1.
2.1 The participatory evaluation
In March 1998, the author accompanied Oxfam HK
staff to investigate the CMS project in Laba village.
Although it was clear that the villagers welcomed
the CMS, sorne issues were raised. After several dis-
cussions, the Health and Ethnic Studies Group of
the Yunnan Participatory Rural Appraisal (PPA)
Network developed a proposal with Oxfam HK to
carry out a participatory evaluation together with
Laba CMS fund committee, the villagers and other
relevant agencies. The evaluation took place in late
1998.
The first activity of the evaluation was to hold dis-
cussions with around thirty village and brigade
32
cadres3 representing villagers in each of the four
hamlets. The cadres raised several issues and prob-
lems with the CMS. These issues included: whether
the level of household contributions was sufficient,
problems with drug stock management, and the
level of technical skills of the health workers. On
the basis of these discussions, the village cadres sug-
gested several objectives for the evaluation and
asked the evaluation team to help them meet the
objectives. Fortunately, the objectives set by the
cadres largely overlapped with those set by Oxfam,
and so could be worked on together.
The evaluation activities in the village lasted eight
days, and activities took place in each of the four
hamlets. In each hamlet, separate group discussions
were held with men and women. Semi-structured
interviews were undertaken with members of poor
households about ability and willingness to pay the
membership fees, and with village health workers
about their medical knowledge, practices and train-
ing needs. A simple household questionnaire was
designed and administered in each of the hamlets in
order to estimate utilisation rates and the level of
funds needed. Evaluation team members also calcu-
lated the average cost per visit through a review of
past prescription forms in order to estimate CMS
fund needs together with the results of the
questionnaire.
The findings of these activities were presented at
open meetings held in each hamlet. During these
meetings, the evaluators presented issues raised by
the men and women groups, members of poor
households and service providers. The villagers
were asked to validate which issues were problems
that should be discussed further. Those issues that
were validated by the ordinary villagers were then
presented to a second meeting of the village and
brigade cadres. The cadres were again asked to val-
idate issues that should be resolved, and were facil-
itated to formulate an action plan of who would be
responsible for discussing and deciding solutions to
the issues.4 Of the twelve actions listed in the action
plan, ten were to be resolved by villagers, through
discussions organised by the cadres, with final deci-
sions either to be made by the cadres or the CMS
Fund Management Committee. The action plan has
since been fully implemented by the villagers.5
According to widely used criteria, the scheme and
evaluation activities represent examples of 'high
Box 1: Description of Laba village Cooperative Medical Scheme
SOURCES OF FUNDS
Villagers
Da Laha Hamlet: Villagers contribute Y5 per person, plus 300 kg. of grain grown on collective land
Other hamlets: Y6 per person.
County Health Bureau (CHB)
initial grant of Y1000 used for the purchase of drugs and simple equipment. These funds came from earmarked funds for
the national CMS policy
Funds for training of 2 new Village Health Workers (VHWs)
The CHB pays a cash subsidy of Y20 per month to all VHWs in the county
The CHB pays for all vaccines,
Oxfam HR
Y25,000 towards the acquisition of the clinic building from the Marketing and Supply Cooperative
Yl0,000 provided for a drug fund, used to purchase 44 types of Western drug (before Oxiam funding, drug supplies were
provided by the doctor himself out of his own pocket).
Township government
Y7000 towards acquisition of clinic building.
SERVICES COVERED BY MEMBERSHIP
Outpatient clinic services: Drug costs at the central clinic and those provided by the two additional VHWs operating in
the outlying hamlets are fully reimbursed. Villagers have to pay out of pocket for the registration fee (Y0.20) and injection fee
(Y0.50). These fees are in accordance with the standard fees set by the Provincial Health Dept.
Immunisations: No special fund allocations are made for immunisations from the CMS. Vaccine costs are borne by the
CHB. Immunisations incur the injection fee.
SERVICES NOT COVERED BY MEMBERSHIP
MCH services: Ante- and post-natal check-ups are not included in the scheme. Neither are they provided by any of the
health workers, since they lack the skills to do so. The township health centre is supposed to send MCH staff to the villages to
assist in providing consultations and checks, but as they have no funds for this they rarely do so.
Non-essential drugs: Villagers must pay out-of-pocket for non-essential drugs such as intravenous tonics,
PAYMENT OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
The 2 VHWs receive 150 kg. of grain each per year, and a cash subsidy of Y20 paid by the CHB. The VHW5 also earn Y30
per month paid by the CMS fund. This is taken from the fees paid by villagers for registration and injection. (Fees earned in
excess of this are paid to the CMS Fund.)
COOPERATIVE MEDICAL SCHEME MANAGEMENT
CMS management regulations detail the sources of fund revenue, benefits of membership, composition of the management
committee, their remuneration, and management procedures. The Fund Management Committee comprises a director, deputy
director, accountant, cashier and senior advisor.
levels of community participation'. The initiative to
revive the scheme came from community members,
the major decisions were made by them, and vil-
lagers were responsible for implementing their own
scheme with the support of external resources.
Likewise, the evaluation aimed to meet objectives set
by villagers' representatives, large numbers of vil-
lagers in each hamlet were involved in the discus-
sions, and decisions resulting from the evaluation
were made and implemented by villagers themselves.
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3 Participation in the Scheme and
in the Evaluation
Three key issues emerging from the evaluation relate
to the impact of different modes of participation on
decision-making outcomes: lack of representation
in decision-making structures, lack of exemptions
for poor households and lack of services for
women's special needs. This section focuses on
explaining why these issues had not been resolved
prior to the evaluation, why they were raised in the
evaluation (rather than raised during the imple-
mentation and management process), and why the
evaluation led to different decision-making out-
comes about the same issues.7
3.1 Lack of representation in decision-
making structures
The origin of the composition of decision-making
structures can be traced from the origins of the
scheme as a whole. The idea of reviving the CMS
was raised by the doctor in discussions with Oxfam
staff, with whom he was already co-operating in
growing medicinal plants. The doctor's primary
motivation in seeking Oxfam's support was to
secure additional financial and human resources for
health service provision in the village. An outline
proposal was devised in discussions between the
doctor, village cadres and Oxfam staff.
Following approval of the proposal, detailed design
was undertaken, the results of which were the CMS
management regulations. These were worked out
largely between the doctor and village cadres with
the support of Oxfam staff. The management regu-
lations included the composition of the CMS Fund
Management Committee. This included the herbal
doctor (who is also the village pastor), the village
leader (who is son of the herbal doctor), deputy vil-
lage leader (who reports to the village leader), and
the two health workers (one of whom was the
herbal doctor's grandson).
When asked about the villagers' role in preparation
for the CMS, the doctor emphasised propaganda
activities through the church, where he is also pas-
tor, and visits to households to persuade them to
join. Almost all villagers joined the scheme.8
Membership contributions were collected by the
brigade cadres in each hamlet at the end of April,
when most households have cash at hand from the
sale of tea. Grain payments for the health workers'
remuneration were also collected by brigade cadres
along with the other grain taxes paid to the state.
However, during the evaluation, villagers in one
outlying hamlet objected to the composition of the
committee on the grounds that current members
were all from the main hamlet in the village. When
raised in the action-planning meeting, this issue
was validated by the cadres and Fund Management
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Committee and later rectified by including repre-
sentatives from each hamlet. A related issue raised
by many villagers in the evaluation was that the
CMS accounts had never been publicly announced.
Although no villagers said that they suspected
improper use of funds, they readily expressed their
discomfort about the lack of transparency Again,
when the issue was raised by evaluation team mem-
bers in the final meeting, the cadres and Fund
Committee members decided that the fund
accounts should be regularly announced in the
churches in each hamlet. Of particular concern to
the external evaluation team was the fact that the
herbal doctor and the clinic health worker were also
Fund Committee members, and thus were respon-
sible for monitoring their own performance.
However, the villagers did not find this a problem,
since, as they said, these two people were well
respected and trustworthy
Because the Fund Committee members were also
influential figures in other spheres of village life,
ordinary villagers lacked channels through which to
raise these issues concerning representation and
accountability9 For example, since the villagers
lacked channels to express their concerns, although
public announcement of the accounts was stipu-
lated in the management regulations, power rela-
tions within the village and surrounding the CMS
made this impossible to enforce. However, the
process of eliciting and validating concerns fol-
lowed during the evaluation activities in each ham-
let enabled the villagers to have a voice. This voice
was then represented to the cadres and Fund
Committee by the evaluation team at the final meet-
ing. This form of representation served to inform
the cadres and committee that ordinary villagers (as
well as Oxfam staff who were part of the team) were
concerned about the issue, which prompted them
to agree to announce accounts regularly O
3.2 Lack of exemptions for poor
households
Prior to the evaluation, poor households were not
granted exemption from membership fees. In the
early stages of the project, the main clique involved
was primarily interested in mobilising additional
resources to support service provision. Additionally,
the poor were not represented among the clique. The
herbal doctor/pastor and cadres specially visited poor
households to discuss membership, with the aim of
persuading them to join. Some members of poor
households expressed their objection (i.e. they had
'voice'), but were in no position to influence the out-
come of decisions, except by not joining the scheme
(i.e. 'exit'), which was the option chosen by some.
During the evaluation, however, both poor and
non-poor villagers recognised that the lack of
exemptions was an issue. When raised in the final
action-planning meeting by the evaluation team
members, the village cadres accepted that the issue
was valid, and subsequent discussions among vil-
lagers resulted in them being given partial exemp-
tions. Additional resources had already been
secured when this issue was presented, and the
issue could be resolved in this manner because this
did not contradict the interests of the cadres and
Fund Committee members.
3.3 Lack of services for women's special
needs
The evaluation also found that the scheme did not
meet women's special needs in terms of services
provided. The health workers were unable to pro-
vide treatment for RTIs that were said by both men
and women to be particularly common, and were
unable to provide ante- and post-natal check-ups,
even though related medical incidents were not
infrequent. The frequency of these conditions was
also common knowledge to members of the Fund
Committee and the herbal doctor, but relevant
training for the health workers was never raised as
an issue during the project design. Although not
contradictory to their interests, the expansion and
improvement of services to include more and better
services for women's diseases were not among the
immediate concerns of those involved in initiating
and designing the scheme. During the evaluation,
when raised in group discussions by the question-
ing of the evaluation team members, these issues
were quickly validated (accompanied initially by
embarrassed giggling) by both male and female vil-
lagers. Subsequent discussions in larger meetings
also validated these issues, and at the final action-
planning meeting, the importance of this issue was
stressed by the male village cadres themselves.
In contrast to the poor households who were able to
voice their objections, prior to the evaluation,
women had no channel through which to voice
their needs. Since the clique and Fund Committee
were the main actors in initiating and designing the
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scheme, the omission of these groups (or their rep-
resentation) contributed to the omission of these
issues in the schemes design and activities. But
when raised by the external evaluation team (which
included Oxfam staff), these issues were validated
and efforts were made to address them.
4 Conclusion
The case study reported in this article demonstrates
that it is possible for a 'community' to be making all
the decisions regarding a health scheme, but for
there to be no accountability to service users. In this
case, the initiation of the scheme was motivated by
a desire to increase the resources available for health
service provision (as much as utilisation) in the vil-
lage. This reflected primarily the interests of the
herbal doctor and the clïque over which he had
influence. Without this interest, the scheme may
never have been re-established.11 Furthermore, it
would have been difficult to mobilise financial and
labour resources within the village without enlisting
the support of the village cadres. However, this
constellation of interests also led to the omission of
marginal interest groups' concerns in the design of
the scheme, as well as its 'closure' to feedback and
criticism from scheme members.
Initiation and implementation of the scheme
through dominant power structures within the
community may have the advantage of reducing the
transaction costs of negotiation and decision-mak-
ing. Indeed, many ordinary villagers appear to have
been willing to submit to non-representative forms
of decision-making, since this also minimised the
transaction costs incurred by them. However, the
structures and processes of decision-making did not
enable accountability to be enforced. Hence, the
evaluation found that certain marginal groups had
significant unmet needs. In contrast, evaluation by
external actors, which included Oxfam staff,
enabled the opinions of marginal groups and ordi-
nary villagers to influence the subsequent decisions
of the Fund Committee and cadres. Thus, represen-
tation of these groups' voice by (relatively powerful)
external actors had a positive effect on the ability of
the marginal groups' voice to influence the out-
comes of decision-making processes.
Some generalised lessons can be drawn from this
case study by examining what goes on inside panic-
ipatory decision-making processes. Participation in
decision-making can be understood as a process
involving both 'voice' and 'influence'. Voice means to
be able to share knowledge or opinions relevant to a
certain decision. Voice can improve the technical
quality of some decisions, and potentially can
improve the fairness of some interest-related deci-
sions. Having influence means being able to effec-
tively contribute to the outcome of a decision-
making process in order to secure one's own interests.
However, the case study showed that having voice
is not a sufficient condition for influencing the out-
comes of a decision, since the outcomes of a
decision-making process are often more determined
by interests and relative power. Influence may be
achieved either through direct participation or
indirect forms of participation, such as representa-
tion. However, it is not necessary that either direct
or indirect (representative) participation leads to
Notes
Discussions of the health system in China can be found
in recent publications of the IDS Health and Social
Change Programme. They are not summsrised here as
the scheme operates virtually independently of the pub-
lic health system.
This is referred to locally as a 'revolving drug fund' in
the sense that drugs are restocked using funds from
annual household contributions.
Village and brigade cadres are leaders at the administra-
tive village and natural village or hamlet level. They are
mostly elected by villagers but also represent the gov-
ernment in many dealings with villagers, such as tax
collection, mobilisation of labour etc. There is a
women's cadre in each hamlet.
The evaluation findings and details of the action plan
are not presented in this article except where relevant to
the argument.
No details are available of how the discussions were
undertaken in practice.
National policy now requires that by the year 2000 80%
of villages have a CMS scheme.
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